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Abstract
The literature on local public (school) ￿nance has shown that the
use of local head taxes to ￿nance schools leads to an e¢ cient allocation
of households and pupils to districts (Tiebout, 1956; Hamilton, 1975;
Calabrese et al., 2009). This paper revises this well established result,
using a two-community model with a housing market that adds two
layers of realism to the analysis: not every household receives direct
bene￿ts from schools (e.g. some do not have children at school age)
and communities are vertically di⁄erentiated, in the sense that one
of them is exogenously preferred to the other by every household. In
such context, head taxation leads to an ine¢ cient allocation of house-
holds to districts, even if local governments set local spending levels
e¢ ciently given their population. The ine¢ ciency emerges because
too many intermediate income "in-school" households reside in the
rich district in equilibrium. Income taxation is ine¢ cient as well but,
in a counter-intuitive result, it may cause smaller e¢ ciency losses than
a lump-sum tax.
11 Introduction
In line with ideas ￿rst presented in Tiebout￿ s (1956) classical article, head
taxation has traditionally been considered e¢ cient and non-distortionary in
the local public ￿nance literature. First, because tax-payers can never change
their tax burden, head taxation is non-distortionary. Second, when it is used
to ￿nance the provision of local public goods that are equally available to all
the residents in a jurisdiction, it constitutes an e¢ cient bene￿t tax, as the tax
burden is equally shared among the bene￿ciaries. Hence, it has been shown,
head taxes induce an e¢ cient allocation of households to districts, internalis-
ing location externalities that emerge under ability-to-pay taxes such as the
property tax or an income tax. In a recent and important paper, Calabrese et
al. (2009) demonstrate this in the context of a rich multi-community model
with housing markets. To be precise, in their model, if local choices of head
taxes are e¢ cient (i.e. re￿ ect residents￿average preferences), then house-
holds￿residential choices do not generate externalities, the reason being that
head taxation is equivalent to marginal cost pricing.
This paper reevaluates this important question. The model considered
introduces two main departures from their model. First, households not only
di⁄er by income and tastes but also in the number of children at school age or,
in other words, in the level of spending they are entitled to receive from the
local government. Second, adding an extra layer of realism, school districts
are assumed to be vertically di⁄erentiated (as in, for example, de Bartolome
and Ross, 2004) so that, apart from local school ￿nance, there exist another
exogenous source of income segregation. Furthermore, to present results in
a most transparent way, housing markets are considerably simpli￿ed and
preferences are assumed quasi-linear in private consumption.
The analysis shows that the e¢ ciency properties of local head taxation
do not hold in the setting considered. In particular, too many relatively
poor households reside in the rich district in market equilibrium. Location
externalities emerge because the valuation in-school households make of the
urban area does not re￿ ect the cost of their education but its tax price, which
is ine¢ ciently low. Moreover, while tax prices do not a⁄ect their private
valuation relative to that of out-of-school households, given that the latter
also pay taxes, the cost of their education a⁄ects their relative marginal social
valuation, as out-of-school households do not receive education spending.
Furthermore, the analsyis also proves that, while income taxation is ine¢ cient
too, the size of the ine¢ ciency emerging under such tax scheme may well be
2smaller than that arising with local head taxes. This paper is thus related to
de BartolomØ (1990), who uncovered the possibility that peer group e⁄ects
rendered head taxes ine¢ cient.
The remaining of the paper is organised as follows. The next Section
introduces the model. Section 3 characterises market equilibrium under head
taxation, which is compared to the optimal allocation in Section 4. The next
one presents results on income taxation. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
Consider a city divided in two separate and distinct areas. The areas are
vertically di⁄erentiated, in the sense that, ceteris paribus, all citizens would
prefer to live in the same area, due to some exogenous characteristic (dis-
tance from a business, shopping or cultural centre, landscape, altitude, clime,
physical amenities such as parks, and so on) which makes it intrinsically more
attractive.1 With no loss of generality, and for the sake of de￿niteness, fol-
lowing the typical pattern of many cities in Europe, we call ￿urban￿ the
desirable area and ￿suburbs￿the other. The di⁄erence in the quality of local
amenities is denoted by ￿u > 0. Districts will be indexed with j. Each area
of the city constitutes a school district whose boundaries are ￿xed. School
districts provide tuition-free public education to every child living within
their catchment area. For simplicity sake, private schools are excluded from
the analysis.2
A population of households with mass normalised to 1 lives in the city.
Households di⁄er along two dimensions: income and household type: a pro-
portion ￿ 2 (0;1) of households have one child at school age while the rest
have none.3 Households with children at school age (in-school households)
di⁄er from those without (out-of-school households) in the trade-o⁄between
local (public) expenditure on education and the private consumption good.
In-school households consist of a mother and a daughter, which implies a
1Physical barriers often divide the city into separate areas with di⁄erent desirability:
many European cities are built along rivers, which separate the two sides: more recently
railway lines and major roads have had the same e⁄ect.
2Note however that the presence of a proportion of children attending private schools
in the rich district would also render head taxation ine¢ cient.
3Among out-of-school households there could be some who have children in the private
or home education sector irrespective of what public schools look like (e.g. children from
very rich or very religious households).
3ratio between the number of children and the population of households equal
to ￿. Household types are indexed with k = i;o. In the analysis that follows





and is distributed in the population according to ￿k (y) 2 [0;1]; k = i;o.
Income distribution functions are continuous, strictly increasing on all their
support and have densities ￿i (y) = ￿0
i (y) and ￿o (y) = ￿0
o (y). The total




y (￿i (y) + ￿o (y))dy (1)
I assume, for simplicity, that the two income distribution functions are iden-
tical: ￿o (y) = ￿￿(y); and ￿i (y) = (1 ￿ ￿)￿(y).
To present results in a transparent way, the model contains the simplest
possible representation of housing markets: each district has a ￿xed supply of
homogenous houses which, to avoid uninteresting complications, is assumed
identical and equal to one half: Hu = Hs = 1=2.4 This implies the city has
capacity to just house the population.5 Equilibrium in the housing market
will entail the existence of a (weakly) positive housing rent premium in one
of the two districts. That is to say, in equilibrium, either ru ￿ rs = c,
or rs ￿ ru = c, will hold, where c stands for construction costs which are
normalised away to zero. To save on notation, in what follows, I will let
r = ru￿rs be the urban area rent premium, which will take a negative value
whenever rs > ru = 0.
Preferences of out-of-school households are speci￿ed over private con-
sumption (x) and the amenity, whereas those of in-school ones are de￿ned,
additionally, over the child￿ s future income. Thus, out-of-school households
do not derive any utility from local public education and only care for taxes
and the amenity.6 To facilitate welfare analysis, and following de Bartolome
4A very close model of local housing markets is used, for instance, by BØnabou (1996).
5It also implies that the population of out-of-school households is not large enough to ￿ll
any of the communities, while that of in-school households cannot be accommodated in a
single district. The analysis thus restricts attention to cases where the two districts always
have a school, avoiding potential equilibria which are irrelevant to the results presented.
6This is not essential for any of the results in the paper. The only requirement is
that households with children have a stronger taste for education than childless ones.
The empirical evidence in Rubinfeld (1977), Baldson and Brunner (2004) shows that the
strength of preferences for education decline with age; that o⁄ered by Fletcher and Kenny
(2008) lends speci￿c support to a view of the political process where childless households
4and Ross (2004), a quasi-linear, money-metric utility function represents
households￿preferences in the model.7 Formally, the utility function of a
type k household with income y is given by:
Uk(x;e;￿u;y) = x + ￿
k
ch(e;y) + ￿uy￿u (2)
where: ￿
k





c = 0) and if they live in the urban area of the city ￿u = 1. Hence, indirect
utility is given by:
v
k
j (Tj;ej;rj;￿u;y) = y ￿ Tj ￿ rj + ￿
k
ch(e;y) + ￿uy￿u (3)
In-school households care for school quality because it enhances the child￿ s
future income. The o⁄spring experience at school and its impact on her fu-
ture income depends on her household socioeconomic background. Hence,
in equation (2), o⁄spring future income is a function of two inputs: school
quality and home inputs. Units of school quality are normalised to be mea-
sured in units of spending, while home inputs are measured by household
income (or parental human capital): h(e;y). The human capital production
function is monotonically increasing in the both of its arguments and strictly
concave; moreover, home and school inputs are assumed complements:8 i.e.
h00
ey > 0. The latter assumption is justi￿ed by the well documented impact of
households￿socioeconomic status on school performance, and implies a pos-
itive income elasticity of demand for education.9 Finally, note it is assumed
that richer households derive greater bene￿ts from urban amenities.10
To focus the analysis on location externalities, I assume that spending
per pupil is chosen e¢ ciently in every district, given the population of pupils.
ally with the poor in voting for low spending. The theoretical model proposed by Levy
(2005) adopts the same assumption.
7The choice of a money-metric utility function completely separates e¢ ciency and eq-
uity considerations in the analysis: because the marginal utility of consumption is constant
and equal to 1 (i.e. households are risk neutral), given an allocation of households to dis-
tricts, aggregate welfare is invariant to the distribution of private consumption and taxes
in the population. Therefore, the only ine¢ ciency source here is the possibly suboptimal
allocation of households to districts.
8Subscripts indicate derivatives.
9Complementarity of home and school inputs is not controversial: parental inputs, home
resources at early ages and during K-12 education, or social networking are all important
to school achievement and improve with households socioeconomic status.
10This representation of utility implies households are willing to pay a share ￿u of their
income in order to enjoy the better amenities located in the urban area.
5That is to say, levels of local spending satisfy the Samuelsonian condition for
publicly provided public goods, i.e. are such that the average (across the local
population of in-school households) marginal rate of substitution between
education spending and numeraire consumption equals the marginal rate of
transformation (which recall is normalised to 1). I then study the location
equilibrium of the city in order to compare the outcomes that emerge under
head to the e¢ cient allocation.11 Of course, local governments must meet
their budget constraint, given by:
ejnj = TjNj (4)
under per capita taxation.
Timing is as follows. Households make a single strategic choice: where
to buy (or rent) a house, or which community to live in. This takes place
at the ￿rst stage and determines the value of the rent premium in the price
of a house in the urban district. When taking that decision, households
anticipate the equilibrium vector of local levels of spending and taxation. At
the second stage, spending and taxes are determined by the Samuelsonian
e¢ ciency condition, given the allocation of households to districts. Finally,
at the third stage, households send their kids to school and consume all
available income.
3 Head-Tax Equilibrium
I ￿rst study market equilibrium under head taxation. The economy is in
market equilibrium if (i) local governments provide the e¢ cient level of pro-
vision, given their population, and balance their budget; (ii) households make
optimal consumption choices conditional on district choice and cannot obtain
higher utility by moving to the other district; and (iii) housing markets are
in equilibrium. An interior equilibrium will be any in which the two types of
households are present in the two districts. Two types of segregated equilib-
rium may exist, as the better school may be located in the exogenously better
area or not. The analysis focuses on equilibria where the urban area provides
11Note that in this simple setting, with homogenous quality units of housing, head
taxation is equivalent to property taxation.
6better schooling (i.e. eu > es).12 I will name these pushed-to-suburbia equi-
librium.
Let us de￿ne two bid-rent functions that provide the maximum amount
of the numeraire a household of income y and type k = i;o is willing to pay
as rent premium for a house in the urban area, given a vector of local policies
(y;eu;es;Ts;Tu) and given the amenity quality gap ￿u. These are given by
the value of the rent that makes that household indi⁄erent among the two
areas:
ri(y;eu;es;Ts;Tu;￿u) = h(eu;y) ￿ h(es;y) + (Ts ￿ Tu) + y￿u (5)
ro(y;Ts;Tu;￿u) = (Ts ￿ Tu) + y￿u (6)
The next lemma presents two basic properties of bid-rent functions that
will be used to ￿nd the market equilibrium allocation of households to dis-
tricts.
Lemma 1 Suppose local governments use head taxation and that eu > es,
then (a) The bid rent functions ri, ro are increasing in income; and (b)
ri(y) > ro(y), 8y > 0.
Proof. These results derive in a straightforward manner from assumptions





y (eu;y) ￿ h
0
y (es;y) + ￿u > 0
r
o0
y (￿) = ￿u > 0
Then, ￿u > 0 and h00
ey(e;y) > 0 guarantee that ri is increasing in income,
while ￿u > 0 implies the same for out-of-school households. (b) Complemen-
tarity between home and school inputs in the production of human capital
also ensures that in-school households are willing to pay more for a house in
the district providing better schooling than out-of-school ones with identical
income.
12While there may exist equilibria in which the good school is located at the suburbs,
e¢ ciency requires the rich living in the good district because of them willing to pay
more from the amenity (note that an equivalent argument could be made if the utility
function were concave in private consumption and every household received the same
bene￿ts from the amenity). On the other hand, the symmetric equilibrium that exists in
typical community models cannot emerge in this model due to the amenity quality gap.
7Remark 1 Strict single-crossing conditions. Part (a) of the lemma implies




















































the former holds provided eu > es, while the latter requires ￿u > 0. In words,
if households of type k and income yH
k are indi⁄erent among districts, then
all households of the same type and higher (lower) income strictly prefer the
urban area (the suburbs). The single-crossing conditions imply equilibrium
will be characterised by within-type income segregation if households of a
given type can be found in the two districts. Moreover, by continuity, any
￿ interior￿equilibrium will have two border incomes, denoted yH
k , that make
households of the corresponding type indi⁄erent between districts.13
Remark 2 Income mixing (yH
i < yH
o ). Part (b) of the lemma, in turn,
entails that income mixing14 will characterise any pushed-to-suburbia equi-
librium. In particular, some relatively poor in-school households outbid rel-
atively rich out-of-school ones from the central city, as they are willing to
give up more private consumption than their identical income counterparts
in order to get access to the better school, because the quality of schooling is
not valued by an out-of-school household.15
Given the size of districts, housing markets clearance requires the two
border incomes to satisfy a housing market constraint, which will be denoted
13By an "interior" equilibrium I mean one that has households of each type living in the
two districts. In a non-interior equilibrium one of the types of households concentrates in
one of the districts and in general that type will not have a ￿ border￿income.
14I de￿ne the "amount" of income mixing as the mass of households with incomes such
that households of the other type with the same income live in the other district.
15Perfect income segregation across districts cannot characterise a pushed to suburbia
equilibrium. Interestingly, in a model with amenities, perfect income segregation could
only characterise an equilibrium if eu = es, e.g. with equalised central spending. Only in
that case bid rent functions are identical across types. But in the context of the model
consider here, perfect income segregation implies the population of in-school households
has higher income in the urban area and, hence, that eu > es.
8as yo = z(yi).16
Lemma 2 Housing market constraint. Let yi be the border income for in-
school households; the housing market constraint yo = z(yi) provides the
border income of out-of-school households such that if all households of type
k and income above yk live in the urban area, and the rest reside in the
suburbs, housing demand equals housing supply in both districts; z(yi) is
implicitly de￿ned by:
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿(z (yi))) + ￿(1 ￿ ￿(yi)) = 1=2 (9)
The housing market constraint (9) requires the sum of the mass of house-
holds of each type with income above the corresponding border income being
equal to urban housing supply. Provided ￿ is continuous, which is assumed
by the model, z is a continuous function. Clearly, z is also strictly decreasing,
that is, border incomes move in opposite directions; as yi goes up, relatively
low in-school households replace higher income out-of-school ones from the
urban area.17 Finally, note that income mixing rises as yi gets away from e y
such that e y = z(e y).
Every allocation of households to districts satisfying within-type income
segregation and the housing market constraint can thus be characterised by a
unique in-school border income yi. Furthermore, to every in-school border in-
come yi corresponds a unique vector of local policy variables (eu (yi); es (yi);
Tu (yi); Ts (yi)). The Samuelsonian e¢ ciency condition determines levels of
local school spending which, in turn, and along the budget constraints, de-
termine local tax bills. It is thus possible to de￿ne two border-income bid
rent functions, which yield, for any in-school border income yi, the maximum
price premium each type￿ s border household is willing to pay for a house in
the urban area, when local policy variables are set at (ej (yi);Tj (yi)). These
are denoted with Rk(yi) and are given by:
Ri(yi) = h(eu(yi);yi) ￿ h(es(yi);yi) + Ts(yi) ￿ Tu(yi) + yi￿u (10)
16Of course, this constraint must be satis￿ed by the optimal allocation and any equi-
librium with income taxation as well. Hence, I denote border incomes without the super-
script.
17The domain of z(y) depends on the size of the central district relative to the proportion
of each type of households. Given the simplifying assumption that ￿ > Hu = Hs >
1 ￿ ￿ the domain of z is S ￿
￿
yi;yi￿
where yi is the minimum value in-school border
income may reach (i.e. such that in-school households with income above yi have mass
equal to 1=2); and yi is the minimum value in-school border income may reach so that





= Hu. Therefore, z
￿
yi￿




9Ro(yi) = Ts(yi) ￿ Tu(yi) + z (yi)￿u (11)
Note that because z(yi), ej(yi) and Tj(yi) are continuous, border-income bid
rent functions are continuous too.
The next proposition proves existence of a head-tax pushed-to-suburbia
equilibrium.
Proposition 1 Existence. Under head taxation, a pushed-to-suburbia equi-









(a) In an interior equilibrium, border incomes and the urban area rent
premium yH
i , yH
o , rH satisfy: rH = Ri(yH






















(b) In a corner equilibrium, yH
i , yH
o , rH satisfy:: yH
o = y, yH
i = yi; Ri(yi) ￿





Proof. Let e y denote the level of income such that z(e y) = e y, that is, the
(unique) border income implying perfect income segregation. Recalling that
the domain of z is
￿
yi;yi￿





An interior equilibrium with rent premium rH exists if rH = Ri(yH
i ) =
Ro(yH





. In that case, the two border incomes are
























conditions (28) and (29) then ensure all households maximise utility in their
district of residence. Recalling that Ri(yH
i ) and Ro(yH
i ) are continuous func-







i ) = Ro(yH
i ).
If, on the contrary, Ri(yi)￿Ro(yi) ￿ 0 then a corner equilibrium exists in
which in-school households with income above yi populate the urban centre,
while the rest live in the suburbs. This is an equilibrium for any value of




. Clearly, the allocation
of households to districts implied by yi = e y cannot be an equilibrium, as
Ri(e y) > Ro(e y). By continuity, that means in-school households with income
just below e y are willing to outbid out-of-school ones with income just above e y
from the rich district, something incompatible with equilibrium. Finally, no
10equilibrium may exist for any yi > e y because, within that range, yi < z (yi)
and, hence, eu > es ) Ri(yi) > Ro(yi).
Point A in Figure 1 corresponds to a pushed-to-suburbia equilibrium un-
der head taxation.
4 The Ine¢ ciency of Head Taxation
I adopt a utilitarian approach and de￿ne the Social Welfare Function (SWF)
as the unweighted sum of utility in the economy. The SWF thus includes
the utility of absentee landowners, assumed, as well, linear in the private
good. Although Pareto-optimal allocations could be found in which es >
eu, implying that higher income in-school households reside in the suburbs,
aggregate welfare would still be smaller than in a pushed-to-suburbia e¢ cient
equilibrium. The reason is that higher income households derive greater
bene￿ts from the urban amenities. The exposition will thus restrict attention
to cases where the urban school is better.
Because utility is linear in x and the SWF weights equally household and
landowners￿utility, the distribution of the (net) tax burden across households
as well as the transfer of housing rents from households to landowners do not
a⁄ect aggregate welfare. Thus, for simplicity, and without loss of generality,
11I assume school is spending is ￿nanced locally through head taxes, that
households do not pay any price for their houses, and that there are no
government transfers to households or landowners.18
Following Calabrese et al. (2009), let ak
u(y) be the proportion of house-
holds of type k and income y that are allocated to the central district. Hence,
ak
s(y) = 1 ￿ ak




















(y ￿ Tu + y￿u)a
o
u(y)(1 ￿ ￿)￿(y)dy +
Z
D
(y ￿ Ts)(1 ￿ a
o
u(y))(1 ￿ ￿)￿(y)dy (13)
The SWF is maximised with respect to eu, es, ai
u(y), ao
u(y), Tu and Ts, subject
to eight constraints, which include four nonnegativity constraints (eu ￿ 0,
es ￿ 0, Tu ￿ 0 and Ts ￿ 0), the housing market constraint, with associated










u(y)(1 ￿ ￿)￿(y) = Hu, (14)













































and two demographic feasibility restrictions:
a
k
u (y) 2 [0;1]; k = i;o. (17)
18Because of the absence of risk aversion in households and landowners preferences, any
level of the rent would be e¢ cient. It is thus without loss of generality that I impose r = 0
from the outset.
12The solution to this problem can be found in the Appendix.
In the e¢ cient allocation, districts provide the level of spending that
maximises the future income of the local population of children. This is the
level satisfying the usual samuelsonian condition for publicly provided private
goods. Given the quasi-linear speci￿cation of utility, this is attained when
the average (across in-school households) marginal productivity of education























The solution to the Social Planner￿ s problem yields two Marginal Social
Value functions, which I denote MSV k
u (y); k = i;o, providing the marginal
rise in aggregate welfare derived from marginally incresing the proportion
ak
u(y) of households of type k and income y assigned to the urban area instead
of to the suburbs. These are obtained by divinding the FOCs corresponding
to ak
u(y) ￿￿(y), for k = i, and (1 ￿ ￿)￿(y), for k = o.
MSV
i
u(y) = [h(eu;y) ￿ eu] ￿ [h(es;y) ￿ es] + ￿uy (20)
MSV
o
u(y) = ￿uy (21)
Next, let s(e;y) be the education surplus of a child who receives education
spending e and whose household has income y; this is given by the continuous
function s(e;y) ￿ h(e;y) ￿ e. Then, (20) can be rewritten as:
MSV
i
u(y) = [s(eu;y) ￿ s(es;y)] + ￿uy (22)
Lemma 3 Given eu > es: (a) MSV k
u (y), k = i;o, are increasing in income;
(b) MSV i
u(y) > MSV o
u(y) 8y < e e y, MSV i
u(y) < MSV o
u(y) 8y > e e y.
13Proof. (a) MSV o0
u (y) = ￿u > 0; MSV i0
u (y) = h0
y (eu;y)￿h0
y (es;y)+￿u > 0.












ee < 0, households preferences for education spending
are single-peaked. Moreover, h00
ey > 0 implies that the peak shifts to the
right as income rises. Given eu > es, then, for any y such that e￿(y) > eu >
es ) s(eu;y) ￿ s(es;y) > 0, whilst for any y such that e￿(y) < es < eu )
s(eu;y) ￿ s(es;y) < 0.
For income levels y such that e(y) 2 (eu;es), s(eu;y) ￿ s(es;y) < 0 when
e￿(y) is closer enough to es than to eu, and viceversa. Hence, as e(y) is
continuous and increasing, and s(e;y) is continuous and single-peaked, for
every pair eu > es there exists a unique income level, e e y, with eu > e(e e y) > es
for which s(eu;y) ￿ s(es;y) = 0; above which is positive and below which is
negative.
Remark 3 Because both marginal social value functions are increasing in
income, the e¢ cient allocation requires within-types income segregation.
Therefore, as in the analysis of market equilibrium, the allocation of house-
holds to distrcits can be characterised by two border incomes, which will be
linked by the housing market constraint (14).






o ). MSV i
u(y) is smaller than
MSV o
u(y) when the education surplus of households with income y is greater
in the suburbs than in the urban area. This will occur in cases where the most
preferred spending level of a household with income y is su¢ ciently closer to
es than to eu (i.e. if the income of the optimal in-school border household is
su¢ ciently closer to the average income of households of this type that live
in the suburbs than to the average of those residing in the centre). Contrary
to what happens in a pushed-to-suburbia market equilibrium, border out-of-
school households in an e¢ cient outcome may have lower income than their
in-school counterparts (Figure 2).
Next, let ￿i
u(y) be de￿ned as the border marginal social value function of
in-school households. It yields the marginal social value of admitting an in-
school household with income y to the urban area when that is the in-school
border income.19 It is given by:
￿
i
u(y) = [s(eu (y);y) ￿ s(es (y);y)] + ￿uy (23)
19The border marginal social value function ￿i
u(y) of in-school households is not neces-
14In order to ￿nd the optimal allocation, the marginal social value of admitting
in-school households with border income y to the centre needs to be compared
with that of admitting out-of-school households of income z (y). The latter
will be given by ￿o
u(y), which can be written:
￿
o
u(y) = ￿uz (y).
The Social Planner￿ s problem always has a solution. The optimal outcome
may be of one of three types, depending on whether out-of-school households
are all assigned to the centre, to the suburbs, or can be found in the two
districts. This is studied in proposition 2 and proved in the Appendix.
Proposition 2 In an optimal allocation:
(a) Corner solution, with all out-of-school households assigned to the cen-
tre: the distribution of in-school households across districts satis￿es within-
type income segregation; border incomes satisfy e yi = yi and e yo =y, and

















e (es (y);y) ￿ 1]










> 0; the optimal allocation rule is:
a
i












u(y) = 1 8y
(b) Interior solution, with households of each type assigned to the two dis-
tricts: the distribution of households across districts satis￿es within-type in-






h > 0; k = i;o
. The optimal allocation rule for households of type k is:
a
k








u(y) = 1 8y > e y
k
(c) Corner solution, with all out-of-school households assigned to the suburbs:
the distribution of in-school households across districts satis￿es within-type








u (y) > 0; the optimal allocation rule is:
a
i












u(y) = 0 8y
Proof. See Appendix.
The next proposition proves head taxation is ine¢ cient, except when
e¢ ciency requires only in-school households to live in the urban centre. Point
C in ￿gure 1 represents an e¢ cient allocation.
Proposition 3 Under head taxation, a pushed-to-suburbia equilibrium is in-
e¢ cient except in cases where it is e¢ cient to have only in-school households
in the centre.
16Proof. In a corner solution of type (a) in proposition 2 the e¢ cient border
income of in-school households is the maximum in its domain yi while all
out-of-school households reside in the centre, so that e yi = yi > e yo = yi. In
market equilibrium with head taxation, however, by proposition 1, yH
i < yH
o .
In an interior solution, e yo = z (e yi), and ￿i
u(e yi) = ￿o









s(eu (e yi);e yi) ￿ s(es (e yi);yi)
￿u
(24)
First, note that the numerator in the second addend of the RHS of (24) may
be positive, negative or equal to zero and, thus, that e yo Q e yi. If e yo ￿ e yi then
market equlibrium with head taxation is ine¢ cient as, again, by proposition
1, yH
i < yH
o . As in the previous case, too many relatively low income in-school
households live in the centre in market equilibrium. Consider now the case
where e yo > e yi. Given the de￿nition of the education surplus, s(eu;y), and
eu > es, the graph of (24) is always below that of (12) in (yi;yo) space (￿gure
1) and therefore cuts z (y) at a point where e yi > yH
i and hence e yo < yH
o .
That is, the equilibrium again has too many relatively low income in-school
households living in the urban area.
Lastly, if the SPP has a corner solution of type (c) in proposition 2, then



























where the latter inequality implies the existence of a corner equilibrium with
head taxation.
Proposition 3 shows that head taxes cannot induce an e¢ cient allocation.
Attaining e¢ ciency requires, on the one hand, households with children to
internalise the full cost of their education, and, on the other hand, the choices
of households without children not to be a⁄ected by local school funding. In-
stead, they should only re￿ ect their private valuation of the amenity quality
gap. However, the private valuation of the urban area by the two types of
households di⁄ers from the marginal social value of them being assigned to
that district. In the case of in-school households, because not every tax payer
increases the cost of local education, head taxes do not re￿ ect the full per-
pupil cost of local schools. Hence, the tax surplus they obtain in district j
(h(ej;y) ￿ Tj) is always greater than their education surplus (h(ej;y) ￿ ej).
17Moreover, as the proportion of children is in general di⁄erent in the two
districts, the tax d⁄erential does not re￿ ect true spending di⁄erences across
districts. In the case of out￿ of-school households, their location choices are
a⁄ected by local school ￿nance unless the tax bill is the same in the two
districts. Therefore, residential choices are ine¢ cient because the relative
willingness to pay for a house in the centre of in-school households is in-
e¢ ciently high. In other words, under head taxation, the allocation with
border income equal to the optimal border income e yi cannot be an equilib-
rium because in-school households of income e yi ￿ "; " > 0 would be outbid
out-of-school households with income e yo = z (e yi) from the urban centre. Inef-
￿ciency thus emerges because too many relatively poor in-school households
live in the urban area in market equilibrium. In cases where it is e¢ cient
to ￿ll the urban area just with in-school households, clearly, this locational
externality does not emerge.
5 Head taxation can be more distortionary
than income taxation
This Section derives the ine¢ ciency generated by income taxation and com-
pares it to that induced by lump-sum taxation. Interestingly, the analysis
reveals that income taxation may actually lead to lower e¢ ciency losses than
head taxation. Under proportional income taxation, the local budget con-
straints of district j is:
ejnj = tjYj, (25)
while the bid rent functions are given by:
￿i(y;eu;es;ts;tu;￿u) = ￿h(eu;y) ￿ ￿h(es;y) + y(ts ￿ tu) + y￿u (26)
￿o(y;ts;tu;￿u) = y(ts ￿ tu) + y￿u (27)
which satisfy part (b) in lemma 1 and require two standard single-crossing













y (es;y) ￿ ts
￿




y (￿) = ts ￿ tu + ￿u > 0. (29)
18Focusing again on pushed to suburbia equilibrium, then, the vector of
local policies can be expressed as a function of the border income of in-
school households (eu (yi); es (yi); ts (yi); tu (yi)).20 It is then possible to
de￿ne two border bid rent functions, analogous to (5) and (6), which will be


























Proposition 4 Suppose the single-crossing conditions (28) and (29) are sat-
is￿ed. Under proportional income taxation, a pushed-to-suburbia equilibrium
exists. Border incomes ￿i, ￿o satisfy vi < vo, and ￿o = z (￿i). Moreover:
(a) In an interior equilibrium, border incomes and the urban area rent pre-




h(eu (￿i);￿i) ￿ h(es (￿i);￿i)
￿u + ts (￿i) ￿ tu (￿i)
(30)
(b) In a corner equilibrium, vi, vo, rI satisfy:: vo = y, vi = yi; Pi(vi) ￿ Po(vi);
and rI 2 [Po(vi);Pi(vi)].
Proof. The proof of existence is analogouos to the proof to proposition 1
and is omitted for the sake of brevity.
As in the case of head-tax equilibria, the comparison between (30) and
(24) shows that the allocation of households to districts will, in general, be in-
e¢ cient under income taxation. Nevertheless, the next and ￿nal result shows
that for any economy in which a pushed-to-suburbia income-tax equilibrium
with larger tax rates in the poor district exists, another pushed-to-suburbia
head-tax equilibrium inducing larger e¢ ciency losses exists as well. Point B
in ￿gure 1 represents an income-tax pushed-to-suburbia equilibrium inducing
smaller e¢ ciency losses than the head-tax equilibrium (point A).
20When the speci￿ed single-crossing conditions hold, the distribution of in-school house-
holds across districts are determined by the border income yi, along with local e¢ cient
levels of spending. Given the corresponding border income of out-of-school households yo
and the local governments￿budget constraints, local income tax rates are also uniquely
determined.
19Proposition 5 Suppose the single-crossing conditions (28) and (29) are sat-
is￿ed and that an interior income-tax pushed-to-suburbia equilibrium exists
with border incomes vi < vo. Then, the size of the ine¢ ciency induced
by income taxation will be smaller than that arising under head taxation if
ts (vi) > tu (vi).




h(eu (￿i);￿i) ￿ h(es (￿i);￿i)
￿u + ts (￿i) ￿ tu (￿i)
< ￿
i +
h(eu (￿i);￿i) ￿ h(es (￿i);￿i)
￿u
where the latter inequality follows from ts (vi) > tu (vi) and implies that
Ro (vi) < Ri (vi). Then, adapting the proof to proposition 1 by substituting
e y for vi demonstrates that a head-tax pushed-to-suburbia equilibrium exists
as well with in-school border income yH
i < vi.
This result clashes with the view of local head taxes as e¢ ciency-enhancing
bene￿t taxes. In the model considered in this paper, not only head taxation
induces an ine¢ cient distribution of households to districts. Imposing lump-
sum taxation may also be more distortionary than taxing an ability-to-pay
measure as household income. The explanation lies on the competition be-
tween relatively low income in-school households and richer out-of-school
ones to reside in the urban area in pushed to suburbia equilibrium. Under
head taxation, tax bills do not change with income. Under income taxation,
on the contrary, they do, making relative tax rates relevant. When the in-
come tax rate is larger in the suburbs, the utility derived from residing in
the urban centre, and hence bid rent functions, increase faster with income.
As a consequence, in-school households with income, say, ￿i is able to outbid
lower income out-of-school households than those they outbid under a system
of head taxation. In other words, when the income tax rate is greater in the
poor district, income taxation generates a stronger motive for higher income
out-of-school households to buy a house in the centre than they have with
lump-sum taxes. This e⁄ect reduces the mass of too low income in-school
households that reside in the urban area in equibrium.
The possibility that the income tax rate is higher in the poor district
than in the rich one is not far-fetched. While e¢ cient spending is lower in
the suburbs, average income is smaller there as well. Relative income tax
rates are also a⁄ected by the proportion of children to the population in
each district. This proportion is larger in the urban area whenever ￿i <
20z(￿i) = ￿o but it is identical when the two types￿border incomes are the
same. Moreover, the e⁄ect of the proportion of children in local populations
will be small for ￿ close to 1. Thus, this is not an element that could per
se discard the possibility under consideration. As a matter of fact, income
taxation data from Swiss communities show frequent cases of poor districts
imposing higher income tax rates than richer ones. For instance, this was
the case, in 1997, of four communities that belong to the canton of Basel-
Land (city of Basel): Birsfelden, M￿nchestein, Bottmingen, Binningen and
Biel-Benken, whose data on mean, median income and mid income and high
income tax rates are reported in Table 1:
Mean Median Mid income High income
income income tax rate tax rate
Birsfelden 52,351 52,033 8.51 23.19
M￿nchestein 58,962 54,567 8.13 22.26
Allschwill 69,302 63,138 7.94 21.77
Binningen 73,405 60,106 7.88 21.80
Biel-Benken 88,610 72,350 7.64 20.87
Table 1: Income taxation. Swiss communities (1997)
Source: Schmedheiny (2003)
6 Concluding Remarks
Head or lump-sum taxation has traditionally been considered e¢ cient and
non-distortionary. On the one hand, it is non-distortionary because tax-
payers cannot alter their tax bill by changing their economic behaviour in
any way. On the other hand, when used to fund the provision of locally
provided goods equally available to all the residents in a jurisdiction, they
act as an e¢ cient bene￿t tax, in the sense that the tax burden is equally
shared among the bene￿ciaries. Furthermore, in a multi-community context,
head taxes have been shown to induce an e¢ cient allocation of households
to districts, controlling for location externalities and avoiding the sometimes
called "musical-suburbs" problem, that is, the poor chasing the rich to bene￿t
from tax induced redistribution, and the rich running away from the poor.
Adding two layers of realism (the presence of househols without chil-
dren at school-age and the exogenous vertical di⁄erentiation of districts) to
an otherwise standard two-community model, this paper o⁄ers new insights
21into the nature of ine¢ ciencies arising in community models. The analysis
showed that head taxes cannot perform the role of e¢ cient prices and are
unable to internalise location externalities. Head taxation leads to an inef-
￿cient allocation of households to districts, even though local governments
choose spending levels e¢ ciently, given their population. This result follows
the contribution of de BartolomØ (1990), who uncovered the possibility that
peer group e⁄ects rendered head taxes ine¢ cient. The analysis went one step
forward by showing, in a counter-intutitive result, that the size of the inef-
￿ciency may be larger than that arising under an ability-to-pay tax scheme
such as an income tax.
The analysis is relevant for the debate on the practice of zoning policies
by local governments. The use of zoning regulations has been justi￿ed on
the grounds that they make property taxation closer to a head tax, inducing
welfare gains (Hamilton, 1975; Calabrese et al., 2007). Results presented in
this paper suggest the need to re-evaluate that conclusion.
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Proof of proposition 2
First, note the problem always has a solution. Given the housing market
constraint, lemma 3 and the requirement that local governments provide the
locally e¢ cient level of spending and balance their budget, the problem can
be de￿ned in a single choice variable, the in-school border income e yi.21 That
is, it can be seen as that of choosing the in-school border income e yi. Existence




, and by the continuity of the objective function. Following















































































21The border income of in-school households e yi determines the population of children
in the two districts and, along the housing market constraint, the border income of out-
of-school households. Hence, local spending levels and tax bills are uniquely determined
by e yi.
22The Lagrangian function is written ignoring the nonnegativity constraints imposed on















































u(y)[h(eu;y) ￿ h(es;y) + ￿uy ￿ ￿h ￿ ￿ueu + ￿ses ￿ ￿i1 + ￿i0] = 0 (32)
￿a
i





















= ￿uy ￿ ￿h ￿ ￿o1 + ￿o0 ￿ 0; a
o
u(y) 2 [0;1]; (35)
a
o
u(y)[￿uy ￿ ￿h ￿ ￿o1 + ￿o0] = 0 (36)
￿a
o(y) ￿ 0; ￿o0 ￿ 0
￿o0 [￿a
o
u(y)] = 0 (37)
a
o
u(y) ￿ 1 ￿ 0; ￿o1 ￿ 0
￿o1 [a
o





u (y) ￿ n
o
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From (39) and (40) ￿u = ￿s = 1. Then, (41) and (42) reduce to (18) and
(19) respectively, setting locally e¢ cient levels of spending. Moreover, (31)
and (32) simplify to:





u(y)[[h(eu;y) ￿ eu] ￿ [h(es;y) ￿ es] + ￿uy ￿ ￿h ￿ ￿i1 + ￿i0] = 0 (43)
Given the de￿nition of MSV i
u (y) by the complementary slackness conditions
(33), (34) and (43):
￿ If ai
u(y) 2 (0;1), then ￿i1 = ￿i0 = 0: (43) implies [h(eu;y) ￿ eu] ￿
[h(es;y) ￿ es] + ￿uy ￿ ￿h = 0, or MSV i
u (y) = ￿h.
￿ If ai
u(y) = 0, then ￿i1 = 0, ￿i0 ￿ 0 and (43) imply [h(eu;y) ￿ eu] ￿
[h(es;y) ￿ es] + ￿uy ￿ ￿h ￿ 0, or MSV i
u (y) ￿ ￿h.
￿ If ai
u(y) = 1, then ￿i1 ￿ 0, ￿i0 = 0 and (43) imply [h(eu;y) ￿ eu] ￿
[h(es;y) ￿ es] + ￿uy ￿ ￿h ￿ 0, or MSV i
u (y) ￿ ￿h.
26On the other hand, (35) and (36) become:
￿uy ￿ ￿h ￿ ￿o1 + ￿o0 ￿ 0;a
o
u(y) ￿ 0 2 [0;1]
a
o
u(y)[￿uy ￿ ￿h ￿ ￿o1 + ￿o0] = 0 (44)
Hence, using the de￿nition MSV o
u (y), and by the complementary slackness
conditions (37), (38) and (44):
￿ If ao








u(y) = 1, then ￿o1 ￿ 0, ￿o0 = 0, and ￿uy ￿￿h ￿ 0, or MSV o
u (y) ￿
￿h.
The value of the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to (14) at the solution
(￿
￿
h) provides the marginal increase in aggregate utility derived from assigning
households with income equal to their type￿ s border income to the urban area.
By lemma 3 and the results above, households with income higher than their
type￿ s border level have MSV k
u (y) > ￿
￿
h and are all assigned to the centre;
those with income satisfying 8y < e yk have MSV k
u (y) < ￿
￿
h, and all reside in
the suburbs in an e¢ cient allocation; while households with income satisfying
y = e yk have MSV k
u (y) = ￿
￿
h and may be assigned to any district.
Noting that border MSV functions are continuous and that their domain
is the compact set
￿
yi;yi￿
, a corner solution with every out-of-school house-
hold residing in the centre emerges if and only if ￿i
u(yi) ￿ ￿o
u(yi) = ￿uy. If








then it may be
that these two functions cross for some y 2
￿
yi;yi￿
in which case an interior
solution arises with ￿i
u(y) = ￿o
u(y). Finally, if they do not cross in that in-








= ￿uy, then a corner solution with every
out-of-school household living in the centre emerges.
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